

REMARKS/ARGUMENTS

This Amendment and the following remarks are intended to fully respond to the office action mailed April 3, 2008. In that Office Action, claims 1-70 were examined, and all claims were rejected. More specifically, claims 53-70 were rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 101 as being allegedly directed to non-statutory subject matter. Claims 1-56, 58-61 and 63-69 were rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) as being allegedly unpatentable over U.S. Patent Application No. 2002/0069222 to McNeely, hereinafter "McNeely."

Claims 1, 8, 18, 29, 40, 53-56, 58-61 and 63-69 are being amended herewith. Claims 57, 62, and 70 are being canceled. No claims are newly added. Reconsideration of the claims, as originally filed and subsequently amended is respectfully requested.

Claim Rejections – 35 U.S.C. 101

Claims 53-70 were rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 101 as being allegedly directed to non-statutory subject matter. Claims 57, 62, and 70 have been canceled. Additionally, the claims have been amended to remove the term "computer program product" and replace the term with computer storage medium. Withdrawal of the rejections is respectfully requested.

Claim Rejections – 35 U.S.C. 102(b)

Claims 1-56, 58-61 and 63-69 were rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) as being allegedly unpatentable over to McNeely. The rejections are respectfully traversed as McNeely does not teach all of the elements of the claims.

McNeely describes a system for adding hyperlinks to a document to be converted into a web page. McNeely teaches that the document is scanned for text strings that are to be hyperlinked to another web page. The system provides for automatically creating HTML from the document with hyperlink tags at the locations of the text strings. McNeely does not teach all

of the elements of the claims.

Claim 1 is directed to a method for developing a first electronic resource for use within a network environment. The claim recites, *inter alia*, “when the second electronic resource is moved from the network location to a new network location, changing the reference file to map the link identifier to a new unique address corresponding to the new network location and maintaining the reference to the second electronic resource unchanged.” As this feature of claim 1 indicates, moving resources to different locations in a network does not affect other resources that may refer to the moved resources. This allows resources, such as web pages, to be moved between servers without affecting web pages that refer to the moved resource. Only the reference file is modified. McNeely provides no teaching with respect to how its system deals with resources that have been moved from one location to another and therefore cannot anticipate claim 1. McNeely makes no mention of moving of resources, much less “changing the reference file to map the link identifier to a new unique address corresponding to the new network location and maintaining the reference to the second electronic resource unchanged,” as recited in claim 1. For at least the forgoing reasons, independent claim 1 is allowable over McNeely. Claims 2-7 depend from claim 1, and are therefore allowable for at least the same reasons.

Claim 8 recites language similar to claim 1, namely, “wherein when the first electronic resource is moved from a network location to a new network location, the reference file is changed to map the at least one of the plurality of link identifier from a first unique network address to a second unique network address corresponding to the new network location and the at least one of the plurality of link identifier is maintained unchanged.” As described above with respect to claim 1, McNeely does not teach moving resources from one network location to another and therefore does not anticipate claim 8. Independent claim 8 is thus allowable over McNeely. Claims 9-17 depend from claim 8, and are therefore also allowable for at least the same reasons.

Claim 18 is directed to a method for abstracting links to electronic resources in a network environment. The method includes, *inter alia*, “before transmitting the first electronic resource to a client, examining the first electronic resource to locate a link tag corresponding to the reference, wherein the link tag comprises a link identifier associated with a network location for the second electronic resource and an executable routine for identifying a unique address for the network location.” McNeely does not teach this element of claim 18. Indeed, McNeely specifically teaches away from this feature of claim 18. McNeely teaches that a web page is sent to a client and after “the browser on the client computer system 13 displays the published HTML document” and “generates a call or request to a common gateway interface CGI on the server,” does the server “locates the Part No. and the HTML location for that Par No. and generates an output representing a URL or Internet address for that Part No. at the document location.” *McNeely*, para. [0041]. McNeely thus teaches that the web page is transmitted twice to the client. *See McNeely*, para. [0042] (“... the HTML page is published twice.”).

In stark contrast to McNeely, claim 18 specifically requires “before transmitting the first electronic resource to a client, examining the first electronic resource to locate a link tag corresponding to the reference, wherein the link tag comprises a link identifier associated with a network location for the second electronic resource and an executable routine for identifying a unique address for the network location.” This feature is distinct from McNeely and makes claim 18 patentable. Claims 19-29 depend from claim 18, and are therefore allowable for at least the same reasons.

Claim 29 is directed to a method for preparing electronic resources for delivery to client computers and recites language similar to claim 18, namely “before transmitting the first electronic resource to the first client, examining the first electronic resource to determine whether the first electronic resource includes a link identifier corresponding to a second electronic resource being referenced as a link within the first electronic resource.” As described above with respect to claim 1, McNeely does not teach, and in fact teaches against, this feature and therefore does not anticipate claim 29. Moreover, claim 29 teaches “transmitting the

prepared first electronic resource to the first client computer to effectuate delivery of the electronic resource thereto only after the identified unique address has been incorporated into the first electronic resource,” which further distinguishes from McNeely. Claims 30-39 depend from claim 29, and are therefore also allowable for at least the same reasons.

Claim 40 recites a system that includes “a processing module operable to retrieve from storage a first electronic . . . and when the referenced electronic resource is moved from the network storage location to a new network location, the processing module changes the index file to relate the link identifier from the unique network address to a new unique address corresponding to the new network location and maintaining the link identifier unchanged.” As described in detail above with respect to claim 1, McNeely does not mention moving resources from one network location to another, and therefore does not teach a processing module that when a resource changes, the processing module “changes the index file to relate the link identifier from the unique network address to a new unique address corresponding to the new network location and maintaining the link identifier unchanged.” Accordingly, claim 40 is patentably distinct from McNeely. Claims 41-52 depend from claim 40 and are allowable for the same reasons.

Claim 53 recites a computer storage medium encoding a computer program for executing a computer process that includes “before transmitting the first electronic resource to the first client, examining the first electronic resource to determine whether the first electronic resource includes a link identifier corresponding to a second electronic resource being referenced as a link within the first electronic resource.” McNeely does not provide such a feature, and as described above with respect to claim 18, McNeely specifically teaches against such a feature. For similar reasons as described above, claim 53 is patentably distinct from McNeely. Claims 54-56 depend from claim 53 and are therefore allowable for at least the same reasons.

Claim 58 is directed to a computer storage medium encoding a computer program for executing a computer process. The computer process includes “before transmitting the first

electronic resource to the first client, examining the first electronic resource to locate a link tag corresponding to the reference, wherein the link tag comprises a link identifier associated with a network location for the second electronic resource and an executable routine for identifying a unique address for the network location.” McNeely does not provide such a feature. McNeely specifically teaches against such a feature, as described above. For similar reasons discussed above, claim 58 is patentably distinct from McNeely. Claims 59-61 depend from claim 58 and are allowable for at least the same reasons.

Claim 63 is directed to a computer storage medium encoding a computer program for executing a computer process that includes “when the second electronic resource is moved from the network location to a new network location, changing the reference file to map the link identifier to a new unique address corresponding to the new network location and maintaining the reference to the second electronic resource unchanged.” As indicated above, McNeely fails to make any mention of moving of resources, and therefore cannot anticipate claim 63. Claim 63 is thus allowable over McNeely. Claims 64-69 depend from claim 63 and are allowable for at least the same reasons.

Conclusion

This Amendment fully responds to the office action mailed on April 3, 2008. Still, that Office Action may contain arguments and rejections that are not directly addressed by this Amendment because they are rendered moot in light of the preceding arguments in favor of patentability. Hence, failure of this Amendment to directly address an argument raised in the Office Action should not be taken as an indication that the Applicant believes the argument has merit. Furthermore, the claims of the present application may include other elements, not discussed in this Amendment, which are not shown, taught, or otherwise suggested by the art of record. Accordingly, the preceding arguments in favor of patentability are advanced without prejudice to other bases of patentability.


It is believed that no fees, are due with this Amendment. However, the Commissioner is hereby authorized to charge any deficiencies or credit any overpayment with respect to this patent application to deposit account number 13-2725.

In light of the above remarks and amendments, it is believed that the application is now in condition for allowance and such action is respectfully requested. Should any additional issues need to be resolved, the Examiner is requested to telephone the undersigned to attempt to resolve those issues.

Respectfully submitted,

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